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Clio
The Anthropologist, Doctors and the Transgender 
Experience: Some Questions for Laurence Hérault 
 
Laurence Hérault is an anthropologist and specialist on  the 
transgender experience She is an Assistant Professor at Aix-Marseille 
University and a member of IDEMEC*, the research center of the 
Maison Méditerranéenne des Sciences de l’Homme. Her research has 
led her to carry out observations of transgendered persons and 
hospital doctors. Clio asked to interview her regarding the circulation 
of medical knowledge and the impact of theoretical debates within 
the triangle formed by the anthropologist, “patients” and medical 
personnel – surgeons, endocrinologists, psychiatrists and 
psychologists. Lawyers, associations and collectives also have a role in 
this context.  The interview is the result of written exchanges and was 
carried out in winter 2012-2013 by Sylvie Steinberg. 
 
*Institut d’Ethnologie Mediterranéenne et Comparative 
 
Clio: As an anthropologist, you work on the medical 
experiences of transsexual and/or transgendered individuals. 
Can you describe these experiences within the medical world as 
well as the various therapies that exist? 
First of all, I would like to say that my work on medical experiences is 
only one part of my research into contemporary transgender 
experiences; I also address other dimensions such as those of 
kinship/parenthood and family ties, for example. Regarding medical 
trajectories in France, trans-identified individuals can turn to the 
protocols offered by specialized hospital teams (there are 6 of these) 
or instead choose an “extra-protocol” path by consulting private 
practice doctors for part of the transition and having surgery 
(particularly genital operations) performed abroad – in, for example, 
Thailand, Belgium, the UK, Spain or Canada. Some individuals also 
combine the two, either beginning with the hospital path and at one 
stage or another abandoning it, due to waiting periods or the quality 
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of care that is offered, or by beginning with private practice 
consultations and entering the hospital path for operations, since in 
France, genital surgery can only be reimbursed by Social Security if it 
is carried out in this framework. 
Regarding the actual content of the experience, several points 
touching upon the pathological definition of transidentity must first 
be specified in order to understand the particularities of these medical 
protocols. Transsexualism, or Benjamin’s Syndrome, was developed 
in the mid-twentieth century and has since been given a fixed 
definition in international diagnostic manuals such as the DSM 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) and the ICD 
(International Classification of Diseases) under the heading Gender 
Identity Disorder (GID). It is defined by four main criteria: an 
intense and persistent identification with the other sex, a persistent 
feeling of discomfort relative to the assigned sex, the absence of 
physical intersexual affection and “clinically significant suffering”. 
This disorder is therefore essentially conceived as a psychiatric 
disorder based on the idea of an inconsistency between sex and 
gender, that is, fundamentally on an essentialist and dualist 
conception of the sexual identity of individuals: the trans individual 
belongs to one sex but claims to be of the other gender. Logically 
enough, therapeutic offerings have been aimed at re-harmonizing 
these two dimensions and there was for a time controversy over the 
proper site of intervention: was it necessary to act on the mind or on 
the body? Since the psychotherapies that were attempted did not 
prove effective, in contrast to the endocrino-surgical treatments that 
were simultaneously developed, the latter gradually became 
widespread. GID nevertheless continues to be referenced as a 
psychiatric disorder.   
 The protocols available in France, generally adapted from 
international care standards (defined among others by the World 
Professional Association for Transgender Health), thus before all else 
provide for a psychiatric evaluation at the request of the patient. For 
hospital teams, this evaluation fairly often plays a sort of gatekeeping 
role, even though the evaluation is multidisciplinary and the final 
decision requires joint agreement of the psychiatrist, the psychologist, 
the endocrinologist and the surgeon. When a patient calls upon a 
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hospital team, he/she is thus received on several occasions by the 
psychiatrist and the psychologist (the latter submits him/her to 
various classic personality tests like the Rorschach and the MMPI, 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory), who see to it that the 
criteria defined in the framework of GID are met and that associated 
psychopathologies are absent. He/she also meets the endocrinologist 
and the surgeon, who for their part ensure that there are no contra-
indications for hormone treatment and surgery. This phase of 
evaluation can last from several months to two years, before the team 
reaches a decision on the case and offers or refuses to include it in 
the protocol. When the request is accepted, the “treatment” then 
begins with a hormone regimen that lasts around one year before 
surgery can be contemplated (the object of a second decision on the 
part of the medical team). The surgical operations that are generally 
suggested are mammoplasty and vaginaplasty for MtF (male to 
female), mastectomy, hysterectomy, ovariectomy, phalloplasty and, 
more recently, metoidioplasty1 for FtM (female to male); other plastic 
surgery operations can also be suggested and/or performed at the 
same time (facial surgery, hair removal, etc.). It should be 
underscored that these operations are not all equally desired by trans 
individuals, with many FtM, for example, opting not to have a 
phalloplasty (because they do not think it is useful to have a neo-
penis or because it involves extensive surgery of uncertain outcome, 
nor even a hysterectomy or ovariectomy (either because they want to 
limit the number of operations or because they want to retain their 
reproductive capacity). Yet performing these genital operations 
remains important if one is to subsequently change one’s civil status. 
Doing so is only authorized [in France] on condition that one can 
demonstrate the irreversibility of the transformation, something that 
judges have become accustomed to associating with vaginaplasty for 
MtF and hysterectomy and ovariectomy for FtM (though a recent 
circular from the Ministry of Justice requests that judges above all 
take the effects of hormone treatment and the individual’s social 
integration into account). In a way, this legal procedure, which is 
                                                     
1 Or metaoidioplasty: an operation that consists in freeing the clitoris, which has 
grown under the influence of testosterone, making it appear as a micro-penis. 
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thought of as the end result of the medical experience, serves to 
authenticate the latter. But it also clearly imposes its vision of what a 
trans body must be, by implicitly requiring that a certain number of 
transformations be carried out beforehand, changes which result in 
the sterility of the individual. In both cases, one may wonder whether 
that should really be its role. In contrast to the choice recently taken 
by other countries such as Argentina, for example, the medical and 
the legal domains in France remain closely dependent on one another 
and one of the major issues in the years to come will no doubt 
concern the redefinition of their relationship. 
 
Clio: What characteristics are specific to the medical “field” for 
an anthropologist of contemporary Western society? 
First, the term you suggest, “field”, can be understood in two ways: in 
a broad sense (that of the medical approach to transidentity in 
general) and a narrower one referring to the site of study (i.e., my 
presence in a specialized hospital service). In both cases, the place of 
the anthropologist is not to be taken for granted, even if it takes 
different forms. First, to work on the medical approach to 
transidentity is to re-contextualize the classic Western approach to 
the trans-identity question, which has long been defined in 
pathological terms. It is thus to venture upon very well-charted 
territory, with many specialists and an extensive literature (the vast 
majority of which is psychiatric and psychological in nature). The 
anthropologist is considered to have some deficit of legitimacy, and is 
more or less obliged to make up for it: you are constantly asked to 
justify your interest in the question and above all to define your 
approach in terms of complementarity. Indeed, the idea – more or 
less explicitly stated by many of the doctors among my interlocutors 
– is that an anthropological approach is only legitimate and relevant if 
it takes an interest in the “narrowly” social aspects of the trans issue 
(an individual’s social inscription, professional or family integration, 
etc.) and serves to in some way complement theirs. Few expect it to 
examine the very manner in which this issue has been understood in 
our societies, to specifically question the pathological definition it has 
been accorded, or actually to take an interest in the manner in which 
they themselves work. 
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 Furthermore, if one understands “field” in the second, narrower 
sense, one comes up against the fact that a “concrete” medical system 
for admitting observers is generally not provided and it is difficult to 
occupy any of the normally available places (impossible to be a 
doctor, nurse or psychologist, difficult to be a “patient”). Unlike 
other sites where I have conducted research, one is as a result unable 
to melt into the woodwork and so is extremely visible. In fact, in this 
proximate field the anthropologist can be as obviously out of place as 
in more exotic fields and his/her incongruous position also makes it 
difficult for interlocutors to understand him/her. The perception 
people have of the anthropologist’s objective and stance is often full 
of misunderstandings: they wonder what you are doing there and 
what possible use you can be. I therefore find myself up against one 
of the well-known difficulties of practicing classic anthropology: 
being at once welcome and unwelcome, familiar and foreign, useful 
and in the way. 
 Moreover, the ethical questions involved in the inquiry proper are 
more salient here than in other fields. It is important to consider 
these questions beforehand and that is what we did with the medical 
team with whom I worked, laying down rules as to data 
confidentiality and personal anonymity. But at the same time, things 
are never settled once and for all. And what I discovered in this field 
– something that had not presented itself to me in this way in my 
earlier fields – was that the ethical requirement my interlocutors and I 
shared was ever present and most often played out in context, which 
obviously is not easy. Given this complexity, it is not surprising that 
the anthropologists who have put forward well-developed thoughts 
on ethical questions in anthropology have generally long worked on 
health-related issues, and when I discovered this field for myself, their 
thoughts were of great value to me. In fact, this type of field forces 
you into reflexivity; more than others, it obliged me to wonder about 
my place: the place that I could / wanted to take, the place that one 
group or another gave or refused me. Asking these questions can be 
productive too: for example, doing so allowed me to see and 
understand essential aspects of the medical arrangements. 
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Clio: What are the specificities of the anthropologist’s gaze vis-
à-vis other approaches and, in particular, medical ones? Do you 
have the impression that these specificities are perceived by the 
various actors with whom you work? 
I believe that the specificity of the anthropological gaze stems from 
its associated capacities of translation and perspective. It is always a 
matter of showing a world and understanding it as it is, one way 
among others of seeing, doing, acting, etc. I try to hold on to these 
two things in my research on the Western trans experience by 
conducting, on the one hand, field work on the medical approach – 
that is, on one of the main sites of the production of “transsexuality” 
(understood as the medical version of this experience) – and, on the 
other, by offering comparisons between ways of understanding the 
trans experience in France and ways of understanding it elsewhere, 
particularly in historically and/or geographically remote societies. The 
effect of these two dimensions of my approach has obviously been to 
deconstruct the dominant conception of the trans question and in 
particular its medical conception, since that amounts to 
demonstrating certain of its characteristics, showing the manner in 
which it operates, both theoretically (by questioning well-developed 
pathological categories) and practically (what do these categories 
become in practice? What does GID become in an actual medical 
system? How is it used? etc.). This amounts to bringing to the surface 
questions that are not usually raised: for example, why is the 
transsexualism clinic so interested in trans individuals’ sexuality, when 
this syndrome has precisely been defined as a gender identity 
disorder, not a sex disorder? Why are we ready to more or less 
explicitly require a hysterectomy of someone to whom this might not 
be either necessary or desirable, without even considering that we are 
depriving that person of the possibility of being a parent? 
 It is clear that, depending on their positions, interests and 
objectives, this deconstruction is capable of interesting and/or 
disconcerting my interlocutors. Moreover, they often  misunderstand 
it somewhat, either because they think that demonstrating the manner 
in which their version of the trans experience has been constructed is 
enough to discredit it – whereas they are understandably attached to a 
version which took time to develop and is useful to them, since it 
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supports their action on a daily basis; or because they interpret the 
alternative conceptions found in other societies as simple models to 
imitate, something they are obviously not ready to do, and which 
fairly often leads to either defensive cultural relativism (“they’re that 
way, we’re this way, and their conception is of no use to us”) or 
towards an ethnocentric re-interpretation which preserves the essence 
of the subject: (“trans experience is a pathology in all universes, but 
elsewhere this pathology is simply treated differently”). A way must 
thus be found to dispel these misunderstandings and it is here that 
the attention given to translation is important. One must try to 
capture the specificities of non-Western trans experiences, showing 
for example that they are based on a conception of gender that is 
different from ours but is not, for all that, foreign to us, in such a way 
as to communicate or at least try to communicate that other ways of 
understanding and living the trans experience are not “solutions” to 
our problems, nor even responses to our questions, but rather 
occasions to formulate those questions differently, which is also to 
say to transform them. Moreover, the anthropological translation of 
medical practices that I propose also tries to respect the positions and 
points of view of my various interlocutors: it is not enough to show 
what they do from a different perspective, they must also recognize 
themselves there, it must also do them justice. If my translation is 
successful, my interlocutors must at once recognize themselves in the 
descriptions that I offer of their practices and world – without which 
I have lost something of the experience I am seeking to convey – yet 
at the same time render them capable of seeing in another light 
unexamined certainties and expectations, as well as the constraints to 
which they are subject, and from which they might free themselves. 
 
Clio: There is an accumulation of rapidly evolving knowledge 
regarding transsexuality. But this knowledge is also a matter of 
constant debate. How do you work with these parameters? 
Since the very birth of “transsexualism”, controversies and debates 
have pitted against one another, among others, psychoanalysts, 
sexologists and psychiatrists. These debates have not completely died 
out but they are much less fierce than they once were, since the 
definition in terms of identity disorder has on the whole triumphed. 
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Roughly put, the sharpest debates today pit trans collectives against 
doctors and, in particular, psychiatrists, over precisely this definition 
of trans identity, as well as relating to the knowledge held by one 
group or the other, a sort of conflict of expertise: Who is an expert 
on this question? Health professionals or the individuals concerned? 
This new debate is part of a more general movement to take the 
patient’s experience into consideration, and also reflects the growing 
influence that trans activist associations have enjoyed in France since 
the 1990s and particularly over the last decade, which has witnessed 
the birth of several dozen associations in the space of just a few years. 
This activist movement, like many others, is at once local and global: 
the associations are solidly anchored at the regional level (often in 
order to receive local funding) but also maintain national and 
international ties in order to support larger causes – for example, the 
“depsychiatrization” of the trans issue during the reform of the DSM. 
At the same time, what can be seen as a form of “professional 
activism” has very recently taken shape on the occasion of ministerial 
consultations and reports (HAS / Haute Autorité de Santé; IGAS / 
Inspection Générale des Affaires Sociales) concerning the trans 
question, with the creation of two associations of health care 
professionals and lawyers over the course of the past two years. 
Working in this context therefore requires constant adaptation, for 
everything is changing very rapidly – approaches, positions, conflicts, 
debates and so on – to such an extent that I can say that the field in 
which I got my start less than ten years ago has completely changed. 
The other difficulty is to avoid losing sight of the complexity of 
positions in the context of high stakes debates that are generally 
extremely intense. The very contentious character of these debates 
can lead the scholar down the dangerous slope of typification, 
especially as the opposing actors themselves tend to typify their 
“adversaries”. Faced with blocs that can too easily appear monolithic, 
it requires considerable vigilance to keep in mind the full complexity 
of the positions, the full complexity of the debates and their 
ramifications. For example, there are many areas of disagreement 
within the trans activist movement as well as within the associations 
of professionals. Finally, the third point that seems important to me 
in such a framework is the place of my own productions. It is easy to 
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see how the remarks I may make here or there at colloquia and the 
papers I may write have no chance of remaining confined to the 
academic universe but will on the contrary be read, commented upon, 
criticized and generally get “mixed up” in ongoing debates and 
controversies. It is obviously not a problem in itself, and in a general 
way, moreover, I help to make my texts publicly available by putting 
them on open access archival sites. But this also means that I need to 
reflect on their content in ways that go beyond the usual academic 
requirements. 
 
Clio: In various types of knowledge that have accumulated 
regarding transsexuality, what place did medical expertise 
occupy in the past? What place does it occupy today?  How 
might you describe the state of the various types of knowledge 
and their circulation? 
In general, medical expertise has occupied a significant place and still 
does, due both to the pathological definition of transidentity and the 
corporeal nature of the transformations that are offered and desired. 
But you are right to speak of ‘types of knowledge’ in the plural and, 
to answer your question, one must distinguish between the various 
types along disciplinary lines, because the psychiatrist, the 
endocrinologist and the surgeon, for example, occupy different 
positions in terms of legitimacy, evolution and use. Since it 
contributed to conceptualizing GID, psychiatry has played a central 
role and is still important since its expertise is always required in 
contemporary protocols. Yet at the same time its legitimacy has been 
called into question, particularly by activist demands for 
depsychiatrization. Psychiatric knowledge on the trans question is 
therefore at once strong and weak, and its future is uncertain; 
moreover, attempts to modify GID in the framework of the present 
reform of the DSM, with new proposals followed by changes of mind 
and a retreat to the old version, are entirely symptomatic of its 
paradoxical and uncomfortable position. The other forms of 
knowledge that are involved, endocrinological and surgical, pose less 
of a problem because they are more immediately perceived as 
“technical”: they offer molecules and operations, and their 
representatives, like those who call upon them, see them in terms of 
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competence, often even in terms of individual competence. Their 
legitimacy is therefore never called into question but their 
manifestations can be, as we see when someone criticizes a colleague 
or when individuals or trans collectives cast doubt upon or, on the 
contrary, praise the competence of a given surgeon. The future of 
these forms of knowledge/expertise is not in doubt and their 
essential task consists in improving and becoming more refined 
(better mastering hormonal treatments and their effects, improving 
operating techniques, offering operations that render neo-organs 
more sensitive and aesthetic, etc.). Due to this situation, the question 
of their coordination, which had been consolidated in the framework 
of the protocols, implicitly becomes an open question once again. At 
present, psychiatric evaluation still makes it permissible to guarantee 
the legitimacy and well-foundedness of a surgical intervention that 
might in certain conditions be understood as mutilation, but does this 
evaluation allow for a reliable diagnosis when its foundations are 
themselves a matter of controversy? Could it be dispensed with, and, 
if so, how and on what conditions? Should we continue to refuse 
requests for partial transformation because psychiatrists do not 
approve of them? 
 The question of the legitimacy of forms of knowledge also arises 
in another way with regard to their internal and external 
appropriation. There are thus conflicts of legitimacy regarding the 
diagnosis and the recommendations made within or outside of the 
hospital protocol: for some people, for example, GID cannot 
properly be treated outside of specialized teams, and private practice 
doctors, even if well-informed, are not seen as legitimate independent 
consultants. Moreover, these types of medical knowledge are not 
solely the preserve of professionals and, as in other places, they are 
the object of “profane”/“lay” – but nevertheless expert or 
knowledgeable – appropriation. A number of trans individuals have 
become very competent in the area, and they are sometimes in a 
position to make proposals permitting their transformation. There 
are, for example, lively and knowledgeable discussions of hormonal 
treatments on forums and at associative meetings, where experiences 
are shared, and discussions take place with consulting doctors. 
Elsewhere, the appropriation of these forms of knowledge is more 
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strategic and takes the form of exploiting knowledge that is a priori 
seen as illegitimate and without foundation: there are thus many 
exchanges concerning the criteria of GID and what one should tell a 
psychiatrist in order to receive authorization for the operations one 
wishes to have performed. In these cases, the individual is not seeking 
to discuss with a professional the well-foundedness of his or her 
diagnosis, but rather to meet expectations in order to get what he or 
she wants. 
 
Clio: The place occupied by transsexuality in the theoretical 
elaboration of the concept of gender is well-known. Has your 
anthropological work led you to reconsider this concept? 
As you underscore, the notion of gender was born in the clinic of 
transsexualism and intersexuality before being adopted by the social 
sciences and feminist scholarship. That obviously had an impact on 
my own work, since gender is not simply an available tool of analysis 
but also a notion that my interlocutors and I have in common. The 
fact that we share this notion is not evidence of agreement because, 
while everyone or nearly everyone uses it, it must be noted that it is 
not necessarily to refer to the same thing, nor even to do the same 
thing. Crudely put, two major references to gender are to be found in 
the framework of transidentity: the transsexualist version of gender, 
and the queer version of gender, both of which are at the origin of, 
and fundamental to, grasping the possible versions of the 
contemporary trans experience. 
 In the transsexualist version, gender fundamentally remains a 
characteristic and property of individuals. It denaturalizes less than it 
complicates the possible description of individuals. In this version, 
transsexual individuals are conceivable because sex and gender are 
different things, and it is possible to describe their situation in terms 
of incoherence: their sex and gender are in contradiction but one can 
/ must re-harmonize them. In the historically later, queer version, 
there is on the contrary a clearer desire to denaturalize and de-
essentialize the question, going beyond the sex / gender distinction 
(understood as a distinction between nature and culture). When what 
we might call first-wave queer thought seized hold of sex/gender, it 
was not to say, as psychology and sexology had done before, that 
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gender identity is as important – if not more important – than sexual 
identity (which historically allowed transsexuations to develop). 
Queer thought seized hold of sex/gender to say that sex-gender 
identity does not exist, that there are only sex-gender performances. But 
this first queer performativity was doubtless very / too discursive and 
many criticized it, particularly trans scholars and activists, who 
emphasized that the body had been left out of this account. Judith 
Butler, for example, tried to respond to this with Bodies That Matter 
(without always convincing her critics, it must be said) and in her 
most recent work the body is also present via the question of 
vulnerability. Whatever the case, later queer perspectives made an 
effort to move beyond this sex/gender distinction in non-discursive 
ways, particularly by attending to the multiple “technologies of 
gender” that go beyond drag, by showing how, via hormones, Viagra 
and the knife, we all fabricate our sex-gender. At the same time, this 
new approach remains based on the notion of performativity and is 
actually still a matter of making something oneself in order to produce 
one’s sexual identity. The subversive use of these technologies 
moreover allows one to constitute multiple alternative identities, 
presented as so many ways of escaping the man/woman binary pair. 
In order to do this, it seems to me that, in a number of cases, one has 
simply reproduced that which one seeks to overcome – that is, an 
identity-based version of gender – by way of multiplication. It is true 
that one escapes from the binary pair, but less than anticipated from 
the notion of sexual identity. Moreover, I also see a difficulty in 
conceiving what is unperceived by the subject (what lies beyond the 
performance) otherwise than via a paradoxical recourse to biology 
(“the power of hormones” is sometimes praised, for example) or an 
often arbitrary reference to norms. 
 It seems to me that the relational approach that developed in 
anthropology on the basis of Marilyn Strathern’s work2 is less of a 
dead end from this point of view. It was developed on the basis of a 
comparison of genuinely alternative conceptions of individuals, 
                                                     
2 The Gender of the Gift, Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California Press, 
1990. See also Irène Théry, who developed this relational approach, particularly 
in her book La distinction de sexe, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2007. 
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conceptions developed in other societies in which, as the volume 
edited by Catherine Alès and Cécile Barraud shows,3 one is less 
attached to categories (man/woman) than to status (brother, spouse, 
mother, etc.). In these societies, individuals are conceived neither as 
simple products of other bodies nor for that matter as the products 
of ego-centered performances. Rather, they are the products of 
relations. Relations are not secondary here in the sense of being 
activities in which individuals already provided with an identity 
engage (whether it be by exo- or auto-identification); on the contrary, 
relations are at the basis of the individual, including their very 
materiality (the body). Organs and substances jointly supply the basis 
of these relations, for the body is not only what individuates us, it is 
also what ties us to others. This is how Marilyn Strathern can say in 
Gender of the Gift that “Western women make children, Melanesian 
women do not”. By preferring the status to the category, moreover, 
the relational approach seems to me better capable of grasping the 
instability of individual engagements. Queer thought presents itself or 
is sometimes presented as the last manifestation of modern 
individualist ideology, to the degree that it is said to be a refusal of 
assignment  (“I am not what you say I am”), a demand for mobility 
(“I am this but I can/want to/will change”) and an assertion of 
plurality (“I am this but I am also that”). This sometimes provokes 
angry protest from many opponents who say that identities are much 
more solid than that, and/or that this disruption of identity is 
undesirable. Yet the demands attributed to queer thought are finally 
no more or less than the everyday stuff of any social life. To 
recognize this, however, one must abandon the identity-based 
version, discard the performance / norms opposition, and enter into 
the established game of expectations and possibilities. In all societies, 
status does indeed make us mobile, plural beings and also offers us 
diverse possibilities of involvement: acceptance, refusal, negotiation. 
In other words, our theory does not describe our practices, and 
gender is for us also a form of action and relation: it is a “factish” in 
Bruno Latour’s sense of the term, that is, something that makes us do 
                                                     
3 Sexe relatif ou sexe absolu?, Paris, Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 
2001. 
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and act in a certain manner, at once “like” and “as”. I have found this 
way of understanding things to be very useful, for example, in 
grasping the particular – and on the face of it disconcerting – 
experience of T. Beatie and other pregnant men who have given birth 
“as men in the manner of women.” 
 
Translated by Ethan Rundell 
 
